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Introduction 
Reassessing the Hu—Wen Era: A Golden Age for Social Policy in China? 
Jude Howell and Jane Duckett 
 
Abstract 
The Hu—Wen era has been characterized as a “lost decade” for economic and political 
reform, but a “golden era” in terms of economic growth and political stability. Yet, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the social policies introduced during Hu and Wen’s decade in 
power. These important policies, however, abolished agricultural taxes, extended health 
insurance, pensions and income support to all rural as well as urban residents, and built a 
civic welfare infrastructure to address migrants’ grievances. These policies, some of which 
were developed under the preceding Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji leadership, were introduced 
for a complex mix of reasons. Their aim was not only to reduce inequalities but also to 
stimulate domestic consumption and sustain economic growth, offset the effects of China’s 
entry to the WTO and the global recession of 2008, and maintain social stability. They were 
the product of domestic bureaucratic politics and experimentation. They were also strongly 
influenced by China’s integration into the international economy, as well as by international 
governmental and non-governmental organizations and the ideas they introduced into China’s 
domestic policy networks. Although Hu—Wen era  social policy reforms had only limited 
effects on reducing income inequality and involved complex politics, they did establish for 
the first time entitlements to social security and safety nets for all China’s population. 
 
Keywords: China, social policy, rural residents, migrants 
 
Some journalists and commentators have characterized the Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 and Wen Jiabao 
温家宝 leadership period from late 2002 to early 2013 as a “lost decade”,1 while others have 
seen it as a “golden age”.2 Those expressing disappointment lament the lack of progress with 
political reform, point to environmental degradation, rising corruption and growing income 
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disparities, and criticize stagnating state enterprise reform.3 Those hailing the achievements 
of the era have focussed on the sustained high levels of growth, expanding global trade and 
investment, and China’s rise to become the world’s second largest economy. In their book on 
the first five years of the Hu—Wen period John Wong and Lai Hongyi laud Hu and Wen’s 
political achievements and their social welfare initiatives.4  
 
Much of the debate has revolved around economic performance and political issues, with far 
less attention paid to the Hu—Wen administration’s social policies.5 Nevertheless, echoing 
Wong and Lai’s perspective, Tom Orlik has suggested that “[t]op of the list of achievements 
is improved public services and welfare provision”.6 Indeed, over its decade in power, the 
Hu—Wen administration adopted a number of social policies aimed at reducing socio-
economic inequalities between and within rural and urban areas and addressing the 
grievances of rural migrants. These initiatives included abolishing agricultural taxes, 
introducing legislation to improve the working conditions of migrant workers, and 
modernizing rural areas through a multi-pronged strategy of “Building a New Socialist 
Countryside”. This involved extending rural co-operative medical schemes nationwide, and 
introducing rural pensions and social assistance. Other social policy reforms centred on 
extending social insurance beyond urban formal sector workers, reforming urban social 
assistance, and improving the legal framework protecting migrant workers in the workplace. 
 
Thus under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the Party-state crafted a developmental direction that 
promised greater social inclusion and socio-economic levelling as captured in their rhetoric of 
“harmonious society” (hexie shehui 和谐社会), “inclusive development” and the aspiration 
to become a relatively prosperous “well-off society” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会). In doing 
so they built on the welfare reforms begun under Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji from the mid-
1990s onwards, which Joe Leung and Xu Yuebin described as “the third turning point” in the 
post-1949 period of welfare provision.7  
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This special section assesses the Hu—Wen era by answering three important questions about 
China’s early 21st century social policies: first, to what extent are Hu and Wen responsible for 
the social policies associated with their period in power? Second, what were the politics and 
policy processes shaping those social policies? Third, how effective were those social 
policies in improving lives and reducing inequality among rural and urban residents and rural 
migrant groups during the Hu－Wen period?  
To address the first two questions the papers by Jude Howell, Jane Duckett and Wang Guohui 
examine the politics of key social policies introduced under Hu and Wen. They focus on the 
politics of the regulatory environment governing non-governmental providers of welfare, 
extending rural co-operative medical schemes (RCMS) and abolishing agricultural taxes. 
These papers use analytical frameworks that examine the influence of China’s leaders and 
bureaucratic agencies as well as the role of other elite actors (central as well as local) and 
international agencies, institutional arrangements, bureaucratic bargaining, ideas, political 
and economic context and international events in shaping the goals, design and 
implementation of social policies. These analytical frameworks – detailed in each paper – 
start with assumptions that the party-state is not monolithic, that Chinese politics and policy 
processes are not isolated from global influences and events, and that processes of 
institutional change are usually gradual. It produces insights into policy processes despite the 
“black box” of elite decision-making in China that arises from poor access to high-level 
political leaders and an absence of reporting on intra-elite political discussions or individual 
leaders’ personal perspectives on issues. 
 
Regarding the first question about the role of Hu and Wen, Duckett argues in her paper that 
they certainly supported the push forward in implementing the “new” rural co-operative 
health schemes. The decision to adopt those reforms had, however, been taken at the end of 
the Jiang Zemin period. Like Wang, she argues therefore that the discontinuities between 
different leadership periods have sometimes been overstated, and that factional politics 
cannot explain this policy. But she also finds other prominent explanations based on “rational” 
decision making and fragmented authoritarianism – to be inadequate. While these three 
classic approaches provide a useful entry-point to understanding elite policy-making politics, 
a focus on leaders and the central bureaucracy alone cannot explain the adoption of policies 
to tackle poverty and inequality. Instead, it is important to understand the influence of 
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external factors such as global economic crises, the impact of WTO entry and international 
organizations in shaping social policies and reducing poverty and inequality.  
 
In tackling the second question about the politics and policy processes shaping China’s social 
policies, we reinforce the importance of incorporating both international and domestic factors 
into policy-making analysis. Duckett in her paper argues that the influence of international 
actors is often overlooked in studies of policy-making in China. Through her close study of 
the development of the RCMS she demonstrates how international actors and events were an 
important force generating and sustaining ideas and shaping policy – a point also made by 
Wang. Howell, in contrast, considers the perceptions that security institutions have of the 
destabilizing role of international actors. Against the background of the Colour Revolutions 
and Arab Spring, security institutions are concerned about the influence that external donors 
can have on advocacy organizations, rights-based groups and cause-driven organizations and 
particularly that external agencies could harbour regime-destabilizing objectives. 
 
On the domestic front, institutional bargaining can play a role in the making and unfolding of 
policy. Jude Howell shows how institutional bargaining affects the progress in advancing 
policies to develop a regulatory environment that could facilitate non-governmental actors to 
provide welfare services. She finds that tensions between institutions concerned with welfare 
policy and institutions engaged in ensuring social stability can influence whether the building 
of a civic welfare infrastructure advances rapidly or slowly, or even stalls. The dilemma here 
has been how to balance social control with opening up spaces for service-oriented non-
governmental organizations to deliver services by facilitating registration and funding. From 
the perspective of security institutions such opening up could also create greater space for 
organizations critical of government and policy to flourish.  
 
Duckett, however, finds bureaucratic bargaining only in the final months of policy 
formulation for new RCMS – though bureaucratic actors are significant actors alongside 
others in policy networks at earlier stages of the policy process. Wang, meanwhile shows the 
interactions among central decision makers and local governments – and how, in a context of 
rural instability, leaders’ economic and fiscal considerations played a role. Both Duckett and 
Wang emphasize the convergence of multiple factors leading to policy decisions, rather than 
the personal experience or characteristics of Hu and Wen or their predecessors.  
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To answer our third question about the effectiveness of Hu and Wen period social policies, 
Gao Qin, Yang Sui and Zhai Fuhua and colleagues then take a quantitative approach, 
analysing the China Household Income Project (CHIP) data to examine whether social 
insurance, social assistance, the New Socialist Countryside and measures to improve migrant 
workers’ conditions of work have reduced inequality and poverty. They find that social 
policies did curtail rising income inequalities, during the Hu—Wen period, with pensions and 
rural agricultural and livelihood subsidies having the most marked effects. But inequalities 
among urban residents shrank more than those among rural residents or migrants, and 
substantial urban—rural inequalities nevertheless remain. These findings add to the findings 
of Howell, Duckett and Wang, who argue from their policy studies that while Hu—Wen 
social policies certainly benefitted rural residents and migrants, their limitations mean that 
they did not transform the overall picture of inequality.  
 
As well as answering the three core questions collectively addressed by this special section, 
the four papers also provide rich material on the content and evolution of previously 
neglected social policies and their outcomes. They make contributions not only understanding 
social policy under Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao but also to theories relating to institutional and 
bureaucratic change (Howell, with the concepts of “bounded adjustment”, “rule creation” and 
“opportunistic layering”), models of policy making (Duckett, with “network 
authoritarianism”) and policy experimentation (Wang, with “principle-guided policy 
experimentation”).  
 
In her paper, Jude Howell argues that the Hu—Wen era deserves a more measured 
assessment than afforded by some critics. In particular, it should receive greater credit for its 
policies aimed at crafting a more positive environment for non-governmental welfare 
providers that could enhance their financial and provider capacity. Focussing on Hu and 
Wen’s efforts to pluralize the field of social welfare providers as a strategy to enhance social 
welfare provision, Howell examines the politics of building a civic welfare infrastructure 
during their terms in office. Civic welfare infrastructure refers to the regulatory environment 
governing the civic building-blocks of welfare provision such as registered charities, 
foundations, unregistered NGOs, advocacy and rights groups, and community activism. She 
focuses on four key initiatives, namely, the revision of the regulations relating to foundations 
in 2004, experimental changes in the registration requirements for social organizations from 
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2008 onwards, policies relating to external actors supporting domestic social organizations, 
and finally the drafting of the Charity Law (eventually passed in March 2016 in the Xi era).  
 
Howell’s article starts out from the complex politics of competing motives and interests of 
state actors that shape institutional changes in building a civic welfare infrastructure. 
Different interests amongst state institutions in relation to social organizations have 
characterized the three main periods of governance in the reform era. In particular, the 
different priorities of welfare-oriented institutions such as the Ministries of Civil Affairs, 
Health and Education and of security-oriented institutions such as the Ministry of Public 
Security have shaped the development of the regulatory environment governing non-
governmental actors. The horns of these two sets of institutions were locked over the 
dilemma of how to create a more enabling regulatory environment to encourage the 
development of non-governmental organizations that could assist with welfare provision, 
whilst reducing the risk of a more open society becoming a site for potentially regime-
destabilizing non-governmental groups, often influenced by external forces.  
 
In the Hu－Wen era (from effectively 2003 onwards), efforts to advance welfare reform by 
making it easier for potential non-governmental service providers to register continued to be 
stalled by concerns about the risks of instability. Against the background of the so-called 
“Colour Revolutions” in several former Soviet states in the early 2000s, the perceived 
external threat posed by foreign agencies such as foundations and NGOs meant the 
government became wary of easing the regulatory framework governing NGOs. Howell thus 
investigates three interweaving sets of inter-institutional politics centring on the tensions 
between security and welfare institutions: the politics surrounding the at times contradictory 
goals of the Ministries of Civil Affairs and Public Security in pursuing respectively goals of 
welfare provision and stability maintenance; state-civil society politics around the boundaries 
of permissible civic organizing; and the politics enveloping the domestic—external actor 
relationship.  
 
In analysing the web of politics underlying reform processes, Howell also adds to 
understanding of the processes of institutional change in China. She argues that introducing 
new policies requires institutional change, that is, changes in the rules of the game that can 
alter the distribution of power and resources and bring about organizational restructuring. Her 
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analytical framework here starts from the position that institutional change is generally 
gradual, building upon and adapting past rules and organizations, and creating new ones. 
Theories of gradual institutional change have identified categories of rule-changing processes 
such as layering, conversion and drift.8 Howell refines these by adding intermediate 
categories of bounded adjustment, rule creation and opportunistic layering. These enable her 
to identify and analyse the processes of policy-making that serve to cement change. 
 
On this basis, Howell draws attention to the array of institutional practices adopted to 
facilitate change when there is a vacuum of appropriate rules and a persisting legacy of 
increasingly redundant, and sometimes obstructive, rules. In doing so she posits the concepts 
of “bounded adjustment” (partial changes to existing regulations), and “opportunistic layering” 
(when local actors in a situation of institutional impasse respond to higher-level cues to 
execute rule change), as strategic means deployed by government officials to push forward 
policy change. By exploring the artful means used to effect institutional change in the arenas 
of four key initiatives she provides greater empirical texture to existing studies of adaptation 
in the party-state. Despite the constraints faced by reformers in fashioning a more plural 
landscape of welfare provision, she demonstrates how during the Hu—Wen period a more 
robust framework was established for facilitating the state’s instrumental use of civic 
organizations in welfare reform. The subsequent Xi leadership went on to use and extend this 
civic welfare infrastructure, rolling out a system for sub-contracting social welfare provision 
to selected social organizations across the country.  
 
While Howell’s paper explores how bureaucratic politics, state-society relations and 
international factors shape the fashioning of a civic welfare infrastructure, Jane Duckett asks 
to what extent top leaders shape policy-making. Specifically, she investigates the role of 
Party General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao in extending the flagship rural co-
operative medical schemes (RCMS). She examines critically three key models of elite policy-
making to explain the implementation of a revamped and extended policy of co-operative 
medical insurance for rural residents: factional power, rationality and fragmented 
authoritarianism. She reflects on how useful these contending models are for understanding 
the role of elite politics in shaping social policy processes. 
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and Thelen 2010. 
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The “new” RCMS of the Hu—Wen era can be traced back to the late 1950s. The scheme was 
extended further during the Cultural Revolution and reportedly covered almost 80 per cent of 
the rural population. Rural residents made “voluntary contributions” to the scheme that were 
automatically deducted by the rural collectives and were used to cover their basic health 
needs. When the reformers introduced the household responsibility system in the early 1980s 
across China, leading to the decollectivization of agricultural production and de facto 
disintegration of other social and welfare dimensions of former collective life, the RCMS was 
similarly allowed to collapse.9 By 1984 it covered barely five per cent of the rural population. 
In the subsequent decades various alternative rural health models of insurance and user 
charges were tried out with the assistance of international organizations. In the early 1990s 
the Ministry of Health returned to the idea of the RCMS and initiated experimentation across 
the country, with the goal of extending it to all rural residents by the end of the decade. 
However, the RCMS policy, because it involved collecting contributions from villagers, 
conflicted with another policy aimed at abolishing the fees that local governments charged to 
villagers. After the Party-state centre prioritized abolishing fees, the 1997 Decision to adopt 
RCMS went unimplemented. But in 2002 the Party-state issued a further Decision and 
announced a new set of experiments that involved governmental as well as voluntary 
household contributions. Backed up by further detailed regulations and a national-level 
review of experimental outcomes in 2005, the Party-state called for its nation-wide extension 
by 2008, ahead of plan. How then can these twists and turns in the destiny of this policy be 
understood? 
 
Duckett argues that international actors and events influenced new RCMS, a key policy 
associated with the Hu—Wen administration. She draws attention to international 
organizations’ funding of RCMS projects and pilots in the 1990s; to the perceived impact of 
World Trade Organization (WTO) entry on agricultural incomes and its effects on 
consumption and potential rural unrest; the role of external shocks, specifically the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis and SARS in 2003; and the World Health Organization’s poor 
evaluation of China’s health system in 2000. These activities and events generated ideas that 
fed into the policy processes underpinning social policy reforms, including the new RCMS. 
However, with China’s economic and fiscal growth following WTO entry, Hu and Wen had 
both the funding and the commitment to drive forward this newly revised health scheme.  
                                                          
9 Duckett 2011. 
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Wang Guohui’s article is also concerned with rural reforms, specifically the shift from rural 
tax and fee reform (RTFR) to the abolition of agricultural tax in China. These were landmark 
reforms in rural development in China, redistributing resources between farmers and the state 
and lifting “the burden” of fees and taxes off the backs of farmers. The policy shift was more 
than an act of beneficence on the part of sympathetic state leaders. It had both a political 
dimension in its desire to quell growing social unrest in the countryside as well as an 
economic dimension related to the Asian financial crisis of 2007. It marked a dual 
recognition of the need to wean the macro-economy off over-reliance on an export-led 
strategy of growth and to expand domestic consumption through rural development strategies 
that aimed to raise the incomes, and hence, consumption of farmers.  
 
Through his textured analysis of the policy process underpinning RTFR, Wang comes up 
with an alternative understanding of the role of experimentation in policy-making. He draws 
upon, challenges and further develops the work of both Sebastian Heilmann and Wang 
Shaoguang.10 In his seminal work on policy change processes, Sebastian Heilmann put 
forward a staged model of policy change, which he coins as “experimentation under 
hierarchy”. In this model Heilmann posited a primarily bottom-up process of policy initiation 
supported by central-level policy patrons. Subsequent experimentation in different provinces 
filters upward, leading to top-level endorsement and nation-wide rolling-out of the new 
policies. By contrast Wang Guohui, drawing upon his close study of RTFR, proposes an 
alternative model of “principle-guided policy experimentation”. He argues that central 
decision-makers first decide upon the purpose and principle of the reform, based on earlier 
local experiments. Only after this is an inter-ministerial agency set up to develop an 
experimental reform plan, whereupon formal, top-down experimentation is promoted that 
ultimately leads to nationwide policy reform.  
 
By focussing on the case of RTFR, Wang also demonstrates that contrary to Heilmann’s 
contention that bottom-up experimentation applies only to economic policies, 
experimentation models can also apply to socially transformative policies, where there may 
be no obvious immediate benefits to local cadres. In this respect, his study gives further 
support to Wang Shaoguang’s position that an experimentation-based policy model can be 
                                                          
10 Heilmann 2008; Wang 2008. 
 
 
10 
applied in social welfare reform. Wang Guohui suggests that in the case of RTFR central 
pressure through the cadre appraisal system was intensified to ensure local-level 
implementation. However, given the financial losses incurred by local governments as a 
result of the forfeited income from taxes and fees, central government was pushed to 
intervene with central compensatory transfers of payment to local government. With the 
central budget in deficit after the Asian financial crisis and the economy still in difficulty, the 
central government was reluctant to expand the reforms as this would require larger 
compensatory payments. However, the reforms were picked up again by the new pro-rural 
leadership of Hu—Wen, who could use the tide of rising economic prosperity subsequent to 
WTO entry to breathe new life into the reforms that were finally sanctioned in 2006.  
 
Howell, Duckett and Wang’s articles all highlight in different ways the relevance of 
international factors to domestic policy-making, a dimension that has been neglected in much 
of policy change research over the past three decades. External factors relate not only to the 
increasing vulnerability of China’s economy to global economic cycles of boom and bust, as 
witnessed in the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and again in the global economic crisis of 
2008, but also to the increasing exposure of China to a diversity of ideas, practices and 
policies from external actors. The significance of China’s rapid growth following WTO entry 
underpins all three stories about social policy reforms, given that economic prosperity 
bolstered fiscal capacity to address issues of inequality, poverty and redistribution to help the 
main “losers” in the WTO deal, China’s farmers. However, as Howell demonstrates, 
perceptions of unwanted external influence have also affected the pace of institutional change 
necessary to build the regulatory, policy and organizational infrastructure of social welfare 
provision. It is thus high time that China scholars turned their attention towards dissecting the 
complex dynamics between domestic and international factors in processes of economic, 
social and political domestic policy reform.  
 
The final paper of this special section examines the effects of social policies of the Hu and 
Wen Period. Gao, Yang and Zhai’s article investigates the impact of key social policies on 
poverty and inequality amongst and between urban, rural and rural migrant groups and 
considers whether they have left a positive legacy. Drawing on data from the China 
Household Income Project (CHIP) 2002, 2007 and 2013, Gao and her colleagues explore 
whether policy reforms led to any changes in the size and structure of social benefits as well 
as the impact of the reforms on income inequality and the gap between rich and poor. In 
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doing so, they examine the impact of four key sets of policies: the introduction of a 
comprehensive social insurance system and specifically pensions and health insurance; the 
introduction of a comprehensive social assistance system and in particular the Minimum 
Livelihood Guarantee or “dibao” 低保, along with various supplementary, temporary 
assistance programmes; the Building A New Socialist Countryside campaign that embraced 
the abolition of rural taxes in 2006, elimination of school fees in rural areas, various subsidies 
to farmers for production and welfare, and rural infrastructural investment; and finally, 
various initiatives to improve the working conditions of rural migrants and social insurance 
coverage, particularly the 2008 Labour Contract Law. 
 
Past empirical evidence on the achievements of the Hu—Wen era in relation to poverty and 
inequality found that social insurance, and specifically pensions, had a greater impact on 
reducing income inequality than social assistance. However, the effects of social insurance 
were regressive, the benefits thereof being skewed to relatively better-off groups. 
Furthermore, earlier studies suggested that the Building a New Socialist Agricultural strategy 
and the New Contract Labour Law did improve the situation of rural residents and migrants 
and narrow the income gaps between urban-rural migrant groups.  
 
Gao, Yang and Zhai’s findings endorse and deepen these broad conclusions by examining the 
size and structure of social benefits for different groups and the redistributive effects of 
various social benefits. Their results demonstrate that in terms of the share of social benefits 
in final income, the size for urban residents decreased between 2002 and 2013 but increased 
for rural and migrant families. However, the size of urban benefits remained considerably 
higher than for rural and migrant households and so the gaps remained. The politics of social 
policy in China and in particular the historically institutionalized discrepancy between rural 
and urban areas accounts for why the government did not push to reduce urban benefits 
further to reduce the gap. Aware that reducing urban benefits might induce protests, the 
government opted to focus on providing more for rural areas. As Gao and her co-authors note, 
a 2010 national survey revealed that with lower expectations rural residents appreciated such 
benefits, leading to a more positive appraisal of satisfaction with local government. 
Confirming previous findings, their paper shows how pensions were the key element of social 
benefits, leading to demonstrable improvements for rural and migrant households by the end 
of the Hu－Wen era. Gao, Yang and Zhai conclude that the anti-inequality initiatives taken 
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during the Hu－Wen era did lead to some redistribution and lessened the market-driven 
widening income inequality gaps. In particular the social policy reforms introduced in the 
second half of the Hu－Wen period of office reduced inequality amongst rural residents and 
migrants, though only to a small extent.  
 
As Gao, Yang and Zhai note, given the recent introduction of these policies, further empirical 
research is needed to evaluate them fully. They conclude that the various anti-inequality and 
anti-poverty initiatives launched in the Hu—Wen period have left a progressive legacy – and 
principles of entitlement to public provision – that deserves recognition and further study. 
Nevertheless, they caution against an overly optimistic reading of the potential of such 
initiatives to tackle income disparities. Two fundamental features of China’s social welfare 
system persist, namely, its fragmentation and unevenness. Furthermore, they underline the 
very limited role of explicit redistributive mechanisms such as social benefits in tackling 
income inequality amongst less advantaged groups, pointing to the fact that as of 2013 the 
post-transfer income inequality levels of all three groups studied were actually higher than 
before. Looking ahead to the future, they suggest that taming the market will continue to be a 
challenge for the government. 
 
Concluding Reflections  
Gao, Yang and Zhai’s paper thus provides a very valuable assessment of China’s social 
policies, and of their limits, at least as measured by the Gini coefficient, from 2002 to 2013. 
This does not mean, however, that Hu—Wen era social policies were unsuccessful in their 
political aims of reducing dissatisfaction. But reducing dissatisfaction was not the only factor 
behind the policies, as the other papers in this special section show. The policy papers 
together cast light upon the many political and economic factors, both domestic and global, 
that lay behind the initiatives implemented in the Hu—Wen period to tackle poverty and 
inequality.  
 
These papers also show that, in fact, some of these initiatives were set in train toward the end 
of the Jiang—Zhu period. The Hu—Wen administration then extended them and adopted 
other new social policies – in part to tackle poverty and rising inequality and to secure greater 
social stability by reducing protest and dissatisfaction. Persuaded by the ideas on social 
development of a range of domestic and international actors, they also sought to stimulate 
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domestic demand by increasing rural incomes, thereby contributing to further economic 
growth and development. Much of this was possible because of China’s sustained economic 
growth and integration into the global economy after it joined the WTO in 2001 and its focus 
on an export-led industrial strategy. China’s WTO entry was made possible by the 
considerable work done during the Jiang Zemin period to push this forward, the benefits of 
which were reaped in the subsequent Hu—Wen years. Presiding over a period of economic 
buoyancy, fiscal capacity, and double-digit growth, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao were well 
positioned to increase spending on social policies that might both help allay growing 
resentment and dissatisfaction amongst losing social groups that was expected to worsen after 
WTO entry and also contribute to further economic growth, social stability and development.  
 
Furthermore, through textured analyses of specific initiatives, namely, the crafting of a civic 
welfare infrastructure, the rural co-operative medical system, and the abolition of rural taxes, 
these papers contribute to understanding of processes of policy change in China. All three 
policy process papers point to the importance of considering international actors in the 
analysis of policy change, a dimension that has been underplayed in past studies. They 
expand the study of policy change in the domain of social policy, again an area that has 
received less attention in earlier policy making research. They also point to the variation in 
the politics of experimentation and the related dynamics between central and local actors, and 
the need for researchers to entertain a wider range of models. Furthermore, they reveal 
processes of tactical rule manipulation in manoeuvring policy change when bureaucratic 
impasses occur or policy priorities shift in a way to deter further progress with a specific 
initiative. Although so many policy processes in China remain inside the black box, we hope 
that these papers contribute in some small way to prising that box more open.  
 
Finally, all three papers note continuities with the past, underlining that political leaders 
never start out with a blank sheet. The issue of continuities is important in understanding that 
there are never clear tidy breaks between different periods of leadership. Social policy 
reforms under Hu and Wen built upon a legacy of changes made during the Jiang Zemin 
administration. Similarly, the Xi administration has passed legislation on charities and 
foreign NGOs that was already being drafted and discussed during the Hu—Wen era. There 
are overlaps that integrate China’s policy processes and periods of leadership in more subtle 
ways than attempts to demarcate clear boundaries and distinctive features can reveal. Five 
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Year Plans span leaderships, and vice-premiers lead policies formulated under previous 
leaders and may continue them if they become premiers.  
 
This is not to say that the first five years of office is merely a continuation of past policies, 
with little room for manoeuvre for new office-bearers. Instead, leaders entering office inherit 
a certain legacy from the past, which they can prioritize, advance, amend or change, moves 
that in turn will be influenced by both domestic and international contextual factors. 
Illustrative of this is the more repressive context of the early Xi years, when although 
spending on social policies continued to grow, new laws on charities and foreign NGOs were 
ushered in. This new legislation marked continuities with the past, but the changing 
atmosphere created by a long anti-corruption campaign, a continuing global financial 
recession, and one of the most severe periods of repression of associational life since the 
events of Tiananmen suggested, too, that leadership style and direction under Xi Jinping 
would differ from the preceding period. In light of this, it may indeed look as though the 
Hu—Wen era was more a “golden age” than a “lost decade”, even if the achievements in 
terms of reducing inequality were not as marked as might have been hoped for.  
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